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There has recently been renewed interest in the history of the British state and party politics 
during the Second World War. This article contributes to that, representing the first detailed 
analysis of a body that became a crucial part of the Whitehall war machine, the Lord 
President’s Committee. Established in 1940, and comprised of several senior politicians, this 
committee had responsibility for many aspects of domestic mobilisation. Sir John Anderson, 
a former civil servant turned National Government MP, converted it into a powerful vehicle 
for the processing of data and refinement of policy. Yet, surprisingly, there has been no 
integration of the Lord President’s Committee within the relevant historiography, and 
political historians have neglected its large and important archive. Charting the period where 
Anderson transformed the committee into an executive arm of the state, the article enhances 









British government and politics during the Second World War has long attracted considerable 
scholarly attention. Historians have recently published several new books in the field, whilst 
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the fascination with prime minister Winston Churchill remains enduring.1 This reflects a 
powerful, and much broader, collective cultural interest in the war.2 This article offers an 
original contribution to academic literature on the period, exploring a crucial yet seriously 
under-studied aspect of the machinery of the wartime state: the Lord President’s Committee. 
Created in the autumn of 1940 to coordinate the organisation of the domestic front, and 
overseeing such major – and contentious – areas of public policy as production, manpower 
and economic controls, the committee has been described as ‘the engine of government’ that 
mobilised the nation’s resources through the unglamorous and laborious, yet vital, work of 
bureaucracy.3 Although Churchill never sat on the committee, preferring to leave its work to 
others, its members included many of the senior political figures of the era. It was led at its 
most crucial stages by Sir John Anderson, a distinguished former civil servant and, from 
1938, an ostensibly ‘National’, but in practice Conservative, MP. 
Only on occasion was the War Cabinet forced to intervene in home affairs. For the 
most part, domestic administration flowed to, and from, the Lord President’s Committee. 
Indeed it could perhaps be said that any serious history of home front government should take 
the work of the committee as its starting-point. Under Anderson it emerged as a ‘model for 
reconciling different departmental interests’ and functioned as a ‘home Cabinet’.4 The Lord 
President’s Committee was a high point of administrative innovation, becoming a vast 
information hub within the sprawling Whitehall machine. As the article will show, it acted as 
a key site of decision-making, policy analysis and power-brokering. 
While some scholars have acknowledged the significance of the Lord President’s 
Committee, investigation into its role has been cursory at best. This is as true of modern 
political historians,5 as it was of the official histories of the war.6 One detailed analysis of the 
wartime government only mentions the Lord President’s Committee three times,7 and even a 
recent work on Britain’s War Machine largely overlooked the committee that oversaw much 
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of that machine.8 Moreover, the physical records generated by the Lord President’s 
Committee represent one of the principal underexplored archival hinterlands of twentieth-
century British history. Extending across 297 files and more than ten thousand pieces of 
paper, the records generated by the committee chart the transformation of the state and its 
shifting boundaries. Importantly, they also describe – in far more detail than the War Cabinet 
papers – the day-to-day functioning of the coalition government between Churchill’s 
Conservatives and the Labour party of Clement Attlee. In short, there has been no analysis of 
the Lord President Committee’s significance that actually utilises the archive that it 
generated, and no integration of it into the historiography of the period.9  
This article properly locates the work of the Lord President’s Committee within the 
history of the British political system at war. Making use of the committee’s archive, it 
analyses the empowerment of the Lord President’s Committee under Anderson; its goals and 
objectives; how these were pursued; and the working relations between senior ministers – 
also representatives of rival political parties. Exploring those issues enables us to prise open 
this vital apparatus of administrative interconnectivity. Given the scale of the archive, the 
article is inevitably not exhaustive. Yet it does suggest that existing understandings of both 
wartime domestic administration and party politics should perhaps be nuanced in important 
ways. 
The article simultaneously draws on, and is relevant to, several bodies of literature. 
First, it complements recent innovative work most associated with David Edgerton. Edgerton 
has placed emphasis on the importance of ‘experts’ and ‘specialists’ in the development of 
the British state.10 Men like Anderson and Ernest Bevin underlined the significance of such 
figures during the war, even at the highest levels of government.11 As Edgerton also argues, 
problems of mobilisation and production were ‘central to wartime politics’ in a way that ‘the 
standard party-political and welfare histories have not captured’.12 Secondly, the article adds 
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to the work of political historians, filling in a notable gap in the older literature and also 
enabling a sharper understanding of the long-standing argument about the nature of the co-
operation between the parties.13 It stresses the importance of Conservative leadership in 
domestic mobilisation. Thirdly, the article adds to perspectives, recently revived by Patrick 
Joyce, about the lifeblood of the modern British state – bureaucracy, memoranda, and the 
flow of data. Joyce has proposed thinking of the state in ‘network’ terms, in which significant 
‘sites’ or ‘nodes’ should be the focus of analysis.14 Conceptualising the topic in these terms, 
and rooting the problem in the mundane world of paperwork and raw information, enables us 
to discern the webs and connections which made the Lord President’s Committee so 
important.  
There now exist quite different scholarly interpretations of domestic administration 
during the war. The more conventional has been to stress the role of the Labour ministers in 
mobilisation.15 Edgerton’s revisionist approach, meanwhile, has complicated our view of the 
war economy, with a bold emphasis on science (and scientists), machinery, the 
standardisation of mass production, and the global nature of the war machine. The findings of 
this article contribute, in some respects, to both analyses. On the one hand, Edgerton is right 
to argue for the importance of Conservatives in governing the home front.16 Churchill did not 
simply cede this territory to Labour without a fight. Besides Anderson, Lord Beaverbrook, 
Lord Lindemann and Kingsley Wood were all important figures. As Simon Ball has 
demonstrated, so was Oliver Lyttelton.17 We should thus be wary of drawing arbitrary 
distinctions between the ‘military’ and ‘domestic’ realms, with Churchill running the former 
and Labour left to run the latter. Edgerton is also right to revise understandings of the war 
economy and what it entailed. On the other hand, older interpretations (poorly fleshed out 
though they were in this respect) were also right to stress the importance of the Lord 
President’s Committee, acting as a powerful coordinating body within Whitehall. 
6 
 
Accordingly, this article does not seek to substantiate either the more conventional or recent 
revisionist approaches. Part of the reason for this is that the existing literature, of whatever 
hue, has not made use of the documentary evidence under review here. When that archive is 
explored, fresh questions and perspectives emerge about both the state and party politics. The 
article thus generates findings that enrich several debates.  
The article largely examines the period between 1941 and 1942. The rationale for 
such a focus is that this was the period when Anderson transformed the committee from 
being a fairly ineffective body under his predecessor, Neville Chamberlain, to the executive 
component of the domestic war machine. The article must necessarily foreground the role of 
Anderson, although he will be seen working with others – especially Bevin. Anderson 
remained Lord President for three years, before moving to the Treasury as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer in September 1943. A familiar pattern emerges here: though historians have 
acknowledged Anderson’s importance in passing, he too has still not been properly integrated 
into the literature. There appears to be a parallel between the neglect of Anderson and the 
neglect of his committee. Neither Paul Addison nor Kevin Jefferys explored Anderson’s 
work as a key figure in the period. Edgerton recently reiterated the role of Anderson, but did 
not examine it in any detail.18 Anderson left no personal papers to consult, while John 
Wheeler-Bennett’s disappointing biography shed light little on his role at the centre of 
government (it was written long before source material was available).19 G.C. Peden’s entry 
in The Dictionary of National Biography is one of only two useful pieces of work.20 In the 
other, Roy Jenkins remembered Anderson as ‘a public servant of unique gravitas, skill and 
reliability’, ‘the first choice for any difficult job which was going’.21 
Anderson’s authority in wartime Whitehall depended on the efficient movement of 
paperwork and a capacity for synthesising information. His forte was chairmanship. Lacking 
a charismatic personality or soaring oratory, the influence he exercised was thus rooted in the 
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terra firma of the modern state; yet Anderson had spent three decades in the civil service. The 
skills of the civil servant were those he employed as Lord President. Elected to Parliament in 
February 1938 as a candidate of the Scottish Unionist party, Anderson was ostensibly a 
‘National’ MP but, to all intents and purposes, a Conservative in his attitudes and 
assumptions.22 This non-party ‘smokescreen’ was always a ‘fairly thin’ one.23 He was ‘firmly 
on the other side from the Labour and Liberal parties’.24 Chamberlain quickly appointed him 
Lord Privy Seal with responsibility for civil defence. He then became Home Secretary in 
September 1939. Anderson had long been regarded as one of the state’s pre-eminent 
administrators, and rapidly made himself ‘indispensable’.25  He replaced Chamberlain as 
Lord President in the autumn of 1940 and set about turning the committee into a mechanism 
for meeting the challenges of mobilisation and resource management. Peden suggests that he 
‘found himself virtually in charge’ of the home front.26 There is perhaps a hint of 
exaggeration in this judgement, but it captures something important. Churchill described him 
as ‘the automatic pilot’.27 To be sure, much of importance was decided outside the corridors 
of Whitehall, in industry and the trade unions.28 But this article seeks to show, in greater 
detail, how those within the Whitehall machine were able to operate their arm of the domestic 
apparatus. Moreover, where Middlemas and others have explored things from the perspective 
of the Labour movement, this analysis – by foregrounding the work of Anderson – helps us to 
understand the complex processes of policy development and execution from the 
Conservative side. 
I 
This section describes the origins of the Lord President’s Committee, its remit, and its role in 
the coalition. The committee was created late in the summer of 1940, at the behest of 
Clement Attlee.29 Given that the mobilisation of Britain’s resources was far from complete – 
indeed in many respects it had barely begun – the Labour leader lobbied for a powerful cross-
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Whitehall committee to act as a co-ordinating body for resource management. For instance, 
he stressed to Churchill the importance of linking the Production Council with the Economic 
Policy, Food Policy, Home Policy, and Civil Defence Committees.30 Different bodies – even 
where they had overlapping membership or remits – could not simply be left to their own 
devices, he argued. And with the War Cabinet focusing on military issues, this meant that a 
new executive body was required to coordinate the ‘mass of committees’.31 In Attlee’s words, 
this was the key to ‘start[ing] afresh’.32 
At the risk of employing more contemporary terminology, Attlee’s thinking reflected 
anxiety at a lack of ‘joined-up’ thinking in government. Churchill held similar concerns about 
the practices of state,33 and thus agreed to Attlee’s suggestion: Neville Chamberlain, the 
former prime minister and still Conservative leader, was appointed Lord President of the 
Council and given the job of leading a new committee which would oversee, and connect, the 
different branches of government. The rapid growth in the importance of the bureaucratic 
machine was one of the most significant consequences of the war and had lasting effects on 
the British state and the horizons of party politics. The work of the committee should be 
placed in this context of bureaucratic innovation and self-confidence. In the short term, 
however, little progress was made over the autumn of 1940, most likely due to Chamberlain’s 
terminal illness. Whitehall committees continued to operate as independent fiefdoms with 
limited co-ordination. The early records of the Lord President’s Committee display a marked 
lack of focus and direction, and the body had no staff of its own. 
This only changed when Chamberlain retired. Under his successor, Anderson, the 
committee began – incrementally but discernibly – to become the high-powered forum for the 
administration of the war effort envisaged by Attlee. Churchill clearly had faith in 
Anderson’s abilities, issuing explicit instructions upon his appointment as Lord President that 
‘I wish you to take the lead prominently and vigorously in this committee’.34 It was ‘essential 
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that the larger issues of economic policy should be dealt with by [the Lord President’s 
Committee] and primarily by you’.35 Churchill ordered Anderson ‘not to hesitate to take the 
initiative over the whole field. You should summon economists like Keynes to give their 
views to you personally…’36 Indeed, historians’ passing acknowledgement of the importance 
of the committee can perhaps be traced back to the influence of Churchill’s own post-war 
memoirs. He recalled instructing Anderson to ‘make it his particular task to grip and drive 
forward the plans for harnessing to our war-making machine the full economic resources of 
the nation. … He soon … shaped the Lord President’s Committee into a powerful instrument 
for concerting departmental plans over the whole range of wartime economic policy. As time 
went on this committee came to exercise on behalf of the War Cabinet a large measure of 
authority and power of decision in this and other spheres.’37 
The resulting empowerment of the Lord President’s Committee represents an 
important moment in the shifting boundaries of the modern British state;38 over the following 
year, the committee was converted into a hub at the centre of the Whitehall network. Meeting 
at least once per week, and usually more frequently, this body brought together many of the 
key ministers of the era. Anderson remained a member throughout; Attlee, Bevin, Herbert 
Morrison, Hugh Dalton and Oliver Lyttelton were members for either all or part of the war. 
And besides the formal membership, meetings were typically attended by eight to ten other 
ministers. These individuals grappled with a mass of raw data and statistics. They were 
supported by the professional economists who staffed the Economic Section of the War 
Cabinet Secretariat, now given a defined role for the first time by Anderson in writing 
memoranda and analysing statistics for the committee. Further, the body’s remit continually 
grew: in 1941, for instance, its duties came to include prices, wages, rationing, industry, and 
manpower. The following year, social services too came under the purview of the Lord 
President’s Committee. All of these were major, difficult and controversial public policy 
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issues. And they were not merely administrative questions. They were political problems too, 
with potentially significant implications for the cross-party government. Prices, wages and 
rationing all had the potential to impact of rate of inflation or ignite serious controversy; 
manpower raised powerful issues of individual freedom and industrial controls.  
Paperwork and information have always been crucial components in the governance 
of a modern state, yet they were particularly significant during the Second World War. The 
demands on the state and those who ran it escalated rapidly after May 1940. Government 
became, in the judgement of the constitutional historian Philip Norton, a ‘regulatory 
Leviathan’.39 The resultant increase in bureaucracy was critical to the success of the war 
effort. Paperwork connected Whitehall with armaments factories across Britain, military 
forces scattered around the globe, and the economic resources of the Empire. Information 
flowed back and forth along a complex highway of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy expanded to 
such an extent during the Second World War that its mastery came to be more closely 
associated with the exercise of power and influence than at any previous point. To a degree, 
the wartime British state was the paperwork that it processed.40 
Bureaucracy is a way of ordering, and utilising, data. By the middle of 1940, the 
volume of data flowing ‘up’ this information highway to Whitehall at any one time was 
enormous and potentially overwhelming. It needed to be broken down, systemised, and 
dispersed across committees and departments if it was to be managed effectively. In 
overseeing this under Anderson, the Lord President’s Committee played two, 
complementary, roles. First, it acted as a vehicle through which information was processed, 
ordered, and circulated into the wider Whitehall system for further analysis. Indeed, the 
creation of the committee was, arguably, a means of forcibly wedging open the arteries of 




Secondly, the committee was a site of policy implementation. Attlee recalled that it 
‘relieved the Cabinet of an immense amount of the work of civil government’.41 The fine 
details of policy execution were considered in a way that did not frequently occur in the War 
Cabinet. As a formal sub-committee of the War Cabinet, the Lord President’s Committee 
exercised authority over a latticework of other bodies: the Home Policy, Economic Policy, 
Food Policy, Civil Defence Committees were all subordinate to it, as was the Production 
Council. As indicated earlier, the records of the committee also offer greater detail than those 
of the War Cabinet. The account of the discussions – who said what, the debate, and how 
policies evolved as a result – is extensive. The archive is divided into the minutes of 
meetings, and the memoranda and discussion papers which were assessed at those meetings. 
The minutes typically extend over six to ten pages, and record discussion of around half a 
dozen issues. The minister bringing forward a discussion paper would usually set out his 
position, and other relevant ministers would then offer their thoughts. A mass of evidence 
would be brought to bear. Issues were often reserved for further analysis, and discussion 
resumed at a subsequent meeting; Anderson would generally work to ensure a degree of 
agreement across the committee. The performance of the Lord President’s Committee thus 
centred on the long-established, superficially unexciting practices of governance – minutes, 
discussion papers, memoranda, and statistical reports. It was highly repetitive. But it was the 
key to Whitehall’s management of the nation’s resources. 
II 
The rest of this article explores how the Lord President’s Committee worked in practice, and 
Anderson’s role at its head. It examines a number of policy areas, assessing cross-party co-
operation and discord. After settling into his new role in the last weeks of 1940, by the 
beginning of 1941 Anderson was ready to move forward. On 17 January the Lord President 
informed his colleagues that he intended to strengthen the committee by improving its access 
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to expert advice. The Economic Section of the War Cabinet Secretariat – which had 
previously been poorly utilised – was henceforth to be ‘divided to form two separate 
bodies’.42 The first, composed of statisticians, would concentrate on gathering basic statistical 
data on Britain’s economic performance to support the Lord President’s Committee and the 
War Cabinet.43 Anderson decided that the second body, consisting of professional 
economists, would work directly for the Lord President’s Committee, analysing trends and 
aiding ministers in devising creative solutions to the challenge of exploiting and managing 
Britain’s resources.44 This was a key step in the committee becoming Whitehall’s central hub. 
It was confirmed two weeks later, when Anderson began a meeting of the Lord President’s 
Committee by relating that he had received a new instruction from Churchill that the major 
problems of economic mobilisation were now to be the responsibility of the committee, rather 
than the Production Executive.45  
In shifting responsibility for the larger issues of mobilisation from the Production 
Executive to the Lord President’s Committee, this indicated a desire to consider problems in 
the widest possible sense and link them together through a coordinating body like 
Anderson’s. After informing the committee of Churchill’s instruction, the Lord President and 
his colleagues then held a discussion over ‘what problems they should examine regularly’. 
The fact that the committee was essentially able to write its own remit is significant. The 
assembled ministers concluded that ‘price policy, wages policy, foreign trade, home 
consumption and compensation problems’ would fall under their collective responsibility.46 
This was a large number of complex topics; but the demands of balancing finite resources 
necessitated that mobilisation be analysed holistically. ‘Various points of procedure’ were 
also discussed: the members decided to hold regular weekly meetings, every Friday at 11.30. 
This would be a standing engagement.47 It was the first step in Anderson’s committee 
becoming a vehicle for shaping the detail of policy. Within months, the new machinery was 
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producing results: from mid-1941 the records of the committee indicate much improved 
access to essential statistical information as a tool to support decision-making.48 Anderson 
then took this further, requesting the statisticians to furnish the Lord President’s Committee 
with a detailed monthly digest of data detailing ‘trends and tendencies’, as well as more 
exhaustive quarterly surveys to support the ‘general supervision’ of ‘economic co-
ordination’.49 These digests would consider (i) manpower (ii) materials and (iii) industrial 
capacity.  
If the foundational elements of the state are ‘numbers’ and ‘words’,50 then Anderson’s 
early leadership of the Lord President’s Committee indicated a determination to use both to 
the fullest extent. In March, he employed the committee to drive forward a major remodelling 
of personnel arrangements in Whitehall as a whole. The Lord President diagnosed an acute 
problem confronting the British state: a shortage of administrative personnel.51 This rendered 
the implementation of any new schemes of controls and planning even more difficult than 
under ideal conditions, because there were insufficient civil servants of the appropriate grade 
to oversee them. Anderson’s solution was to demand greater imagination from government. 
He proposed more ‘delegation than was permissible in peace’ and the ‘dilution’ of staff in 
departments – with new or junior personnel entrusted with mid-level roles – to free up 
experienced colleagues to work elsewhere.52 Anderson insisted that Whitehall operate purely 
on the basis of merit: ‘there should be no hesitation in giving greater responsibility to 
promising officers, irrespective of their youth or standing’. It was a blueprint for a significant 
shakeup of Whitehall staffing arrangements. The Lord President’s Committee approved 
Anderson’s proposal, and he was tasked with drawing up a memorandum for circulation 
around the departments of state.53 The resultant three-page document explained that 
War inevitably produces a great increase in the volume and complexity of the business of government. In ‘total 
war’ this increase is substantially greater because of the extent to which the government is forced to assume 
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control over the machinery of supply, production and distribution. The Lord President’s Committee have had 
this position under review and are concerned at the growing demand for staff to administer these new schemes 
of control. There is a great danger that the supply of administrative and technical staff may be so heavily taxed, 
and the existing administrative skills spread so thinly … that the efficiency of our wartime economy will 
suffer.54 
To attempt to plug this gap by bringing in new staff from business would only deprive 
industry of essential leaders.55 Therefore ‘existing grades and seniority in the civil service 
must not be allowed to prevent rapid temporary promotion on grounds of efficiency’. 
Anderson asked departments to ‘think carefully’ about available staff when developing new 
schemes of controls: ‘every effort should be made to introduce the utmost degree of 
administrative simplicity’, and ‘the ideal scheme’ may be an ‘unjustifiable extravagance’.56 
Importantly, the Lord President suggested that the government should look to industry and 
trade unions to run control schemes themselves wherever possible.57 
The Cabinet Secretary, Edward Bridges, held to the view that Anderson was ‘the best 
we have’.58 But one explanation for the overall success of the Lord President’s Committee is 
that its members also constituted an effective team; Anderson, Attlee, Bevin, Lyttelton and 
Wood were natural administrators and problem-solvers, at home grappling with detail. Their 
styles were complementary. Anderson and Bevin, in particular, enjoyed an excellent working 
relationship that was central to the day-to-day operation of the committee. Bevin’s biographer 
emphasised the importance of this relationship in passing, but, being unable to study the 
records of the committee, did not examine its practical application. Nor did he stress 
Anderson’s leadership role.59 The two men corresponded extensively with lots of short notes 
and had their heads together on a huge range of problems.60 Both boasted a formidable grasp 
of detail. In the committee itself, Bevin would typically make a decision after in-depth study 
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and, during subsequent discussions, Anderson could be relied upon to ensure that he was 
supported.61  
Indeed, the records of the committee indicate that it may be here, in terms of good 
working relations, that a ‘consensus’ between the major political figures of the era can be said 
to have developed. Attlee later remembered that the key to the committee’s success was that 
‘it had about five top-ranking ministers with power to act’.62 This ‘made for rapid business’.63 
Though the body grappled with a number of deeply party-political questions – especially 
economic controls of all kinds – there is, perhaps surprisingly, very limited evidence of 
disagreement along party lines. Where there was discord, this tended to be because ministers 
saw problems from the perspective of their departmental fiefdoms; for the most part, 
pragmatism appears to have held sway.  
Anderson’s role in smoothing over problems was also evident from the importance of 
his relationship with the Conservative maverick Lord Beaverbrook. Despite being intimately 
involved in mobilisation matters for much of the war – serving as Minister of Aircraft 
Production, Minister of Supply and Minister of War Production between 1940 and 1943 – 
Beaverbrook was never a member of the committee and attended its meetings very 
infrequently. This is surprising, given that his brief touched on much of the committee’s work 
and, with the exception of Bevin, no minister wrestled with these problems for so long. It is 
unclear exactly why Beaverbrook was not a member, but it is likely that his long-running and 
rancorous turf war with Bevin represents part of the explanation; the two simply could not 
work together and Beaverbrook was fond of resignation threats.64 He seemed to imagine a 
‘cabal’ of ministers organised against him.65 That Beaverbrook was not a member of the 
committee, rather than indicating its limitations within Whitehall, arguably reinforces the 
importance of personal relationships inside the machine – as Attlee’s judgement of the 
committee’s success implies. Where these relationships were collegiate, work was processed 
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smoothly; where they were not, things were more difficult. ‘We all worked as a team’, Attlee 
stated, whereas Beaverbrook ‘was a lone wolf’ who ‘thought he could take what he wanted 
without consulting anybody. He was highly mistaken’.66 As such, Anderson maintained a 
private, back-channel correspondence with Beaverbrook. In a series of letters addressed to 
‘Dear Max’ and ‘Dear John’, the two communicated informally about resource-management 
and Anderson carefully kept Beaverbrook apprised of decisions taken by the committee that 
would affect him.67 Beaverbrook called the Lord President his ‘one good friend’ in 
government, writing that ‘I ‘trust you almost above all others’.68 Anderson’s role as an 
informal bridge linking Bevin’s Whitehall turf to that of Beaverbrook may well have been 
important. 
The records of the committee thus provide fresh insights into the operation of the 
coalition government. Importantly, they offer plentiful examples of relatively smooth cross-
party co-operation. In January 1941, for instance, Anderson and Kingsley Wood actively 
cultivated Labour party opinion in framing the Determination of Needs Bill, which would 
abolish the means test.69 They had lobbied ‘certain government supporters’ as well, which 
seems likely to mean influential Conservative backbenchers.70 The two enjoyed the 
‘assistance’ of Attlee and Bevin in making these representations, with the result that the 
committee judged the Bill as ‘likely’ to be welcomed in Parliament.71 This was a good 
example of the Lord President’s Committee representing a device for implementing tricky 
policies in a conciliatory and uncontroversial fashion. The following month another 
potentially inflammatory issue, rationing and living standards, was dealt with in a similar 
manner. Lyttelton, as President of the Board of Trade, had warned of the ‘social 
maldistribution’ of consumer goods due to rising prices, with the working-classes losing 
out.72 Despite being a Conservative, Lyttelton was the most aggressive advocate of wartime 
controls – for instance he wanted to make any form of barter illegal73 –and constantly sought 
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increased powers.74 The Lord President’s Committee agreed that Lyttelton should prepare a 
rationing programme which could be brought into effect should the situation deteriorate,75 
acknowledging the probable need to exercise ‘close control’ over price levels.76 In a detailed 
discussion, the committee also identified the specific ‘levers’ which would enable the state to 
do this: powers over labour, raw materials, and the ability to write contracts, concluding that 
legislation would not be necessary in order to implement this scheme of controls.77 
This was the recipe for a significant reorganisation of the economic life of the 
country, but its outlines were agreed easily and without rancour. Conservative politicians had 
been at least as energetic in this work as Labour ministers. Moreover the exigencies of war 
alone do not represent a particularly satisfying explanation for this. The modest July 1940 
Budget,78 with a slight squeeze on living standards, had provoked outrage from the Labour 
party, while Churchill could be so relied upon to complain about anything that resembled a 
concession to statism that one draft memorandum was labelled ‘Peptonised and Predigested 
for the PM’.79 It is perhaps more likely that the Lord President’s Committee, with its regular 
meetings and position within Whitehall, represented an effective trouble-shooting body. 
Churchill’s absence was, from this perspective, an advantage. 
Anderson subsequently took the lead in the advocacy of rationing policy. While 
expressing acute political anxiety that it would prove unpopular with the public, the Lord 
President ‘saw no means of avoiding … an extension of rationing’.80 In April 1941 he told 
the committee that ‘some extension’ was ‘inevitable’ to avoid either major price inflation or 
shop shortages.81 As a first step, in May the Lord President’s Committee submitted 
Lyttelton’s clothes rationing scheme to the War Cabinet for approval.82 Churchill was 
resistant, but rated Lyttelton highly and grudgingly relented.83 In September it was Anderson 
himself who oversaw the more difficult proposal for food rationing.84 In deciding the shape 
of the scheme, he had overruled the Minister of Food, Lord Woolton, at the Lord President’s 
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Committee. Woolton favoured a ‘group system’, whereby consumers would register with a 
particular retailer and choose from their products. Anderson, in contrast, strongly supported 
‘points rationing’ – as demand and value fluctuated, the points system could be adjusted so as 
to achieve stabilisation; the ‘points’ (effectively, the cost) allocated to particular commodities 
might be modified.85 Not being tied to a specific retailer would also give consumers greater 
choice and encourage competition and better service.86 After a heated discussion, Bevin came 
down on Anderson’s side and points rationing was approved by the committee. The War 
Cabinet gave the go-ahead to his food rationing plan on 11 September.87 As the article has 
suggested, Anderson’s expertise as a chairman had been integral to the effectiveness of the 
British state. The bureaucratic machinery of his committee held the apparatus together, 
organising its functions in both time and space. On all except a handful of domestic problems 
between 1940 and 1945, the War Cabinet essentially rubberstamped decisions which had 
already been taken; real responsibility lay with the Lord President’s Committee. 
 
III 
It seems worthwhile to examine an individual case study of the committee at work, analysing 
its records and charting the way in which a specific policy issue was managed by Anderson 
and his colleagues over a sustained period of time. The allocation of Britain’s human 
resources had been a major problem during the First World War,88 and during the Second no 
issue vexed the Lord President’s Committee as acutely or for as long as that of manpower in 
the coal industry. The human aspects of mobilisation have been dealt with by a number of 
scholars;89 but considering this from the perspective of the government’s executive domestic 
body sheds new light on how policy problems were tackled. This issue bedevilled the 
committee for almost two years and demonstrated both the authority of the body and its 
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limitations. As will become apparent, it was a close-run thing and, without the Lord 
President’s Committee, the British state would perhaps have lacked the apparatus to cope. 
In a nutshell, coal was vital to fuel Britain’s production. But the industry was faced 
with a manpower deficit; there were inadequate miners to produce the necessary amount of 
coal. The obvious solution, to transfer personnel from elsewhere – other sectors of industry or 
the military – carried grave risks to production and national security. This was a challenge 
with no easy answer, yet Anderson and Bevin, particularly, were compelled to grapple with it 
at length. 
The government had introduced an Essential Work Order to prevent miners from 
leaving their jobs for employment elsewhere, but in mid-1941 the miners’ union demanded a 
wage increase as a quid pro quo. Given that the coal production situation was ‘already 
serious’, securing the ‘full co-operation’ of the workforce was deemed essential’ by Wood, 
the Chancellor, if a ‘grave crisis’ was to be avoided; Lyttelton therefore approved the 
employers’ offer of a 1-/per shift ‘bonus’ to be paid to each miner as a gesture of 
‘goodwill’.90 Bevin signalled his backing.91 Yet within weeks it was calculated by the Board 
of Trade (now led by Andrew Duncan, with Lyttelton sent out to the Middle East as Minister-
Resident) that with the existing workforce in the mines it would prove difficult to produce the 
4.6 million tons of coal per week that were estimated as being necessary to support 
mobilisation.92 As a way out of this impasse, in July Bevin agreed that some ex-miners 
employed in other industries should be returned to the pits. He suggested that this would 
quickly – within ten to fourteen days – raise 25,000 new miners.93 
However, that figure proved to be wildly optimistic. The question of boosting 
manpower would therefore be a theme for discussion at most meetings of the Lord 
President’s Committee for the next two years. To be sure, within days 23,714 former miners 
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had signalled their willingness to return to the pits;94 the problem was actually getting them 
there. Securing their release from other employment was challenging. By late August 1941, 
only 11,528 had actually returned to the mines.95 To make matters worse, the union rejected 
the ‘bonus’ offer and demanded a flat wage increase.96 Bevin suggested utilising the Essential 
Work Order to extricate 5,000 additional ex-miners from their current employment; the Lord 
President’s Committee authorised him to investigate the practicalities and implications of 
doing this.97 The members of the committee recorded at the War Cabinet their hope to boost 
the workforce by 30,000 within two weeks, the ideal number of employees in the mines being 
720,000.98 Bevin was given ‘full discretion’ to tackle the crisis.99 Meanwhile Anderson 
supported Bevin’s argument that the government must agree to an ‘extremely awkward’ wage 
increase in the sector, despite the inflationary precedent it would set elsewhere.100 
The instrument that Bevin used was to gradually bleed manpower from other 
industries. The Minister of Labour opposed withdrawing men from the military and thus the 
miners had to come from different areas of domestic employment.101 By 26 September, 
21,000 ex-miners were back in the pits;102 in late October the workforce reached 706,000.103 
At the end of the year, weekly production was 250,000 tons higher than the previous year.104 
Yet, despite this seeming success, the apparatus of state simply could not reach the declared 
objective of 720,000 miners. By March 1942, the number of miners had not increased for five 
months.105 With the military side of the war increasing in intensity, official projections of 
Britain’s coal use were constantly rising. The latest President of the Board of Trade, Labour’s 
Hugh Dalton, pleaded that even ‘immediate needs’ could not be met without withdrawing 
former miners from the army.106 The problem was becoming intractable. 
Despite the efforts of the Lord President’s Committee over the second half of 1941, 
the crisis had thus returned. The Secretary of State for War did offer to release, on a 
temporary basis, ex-miners in the military if they were stationed in Britain, but refused to 
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withdraw personnel from active units.107 He indicated that this would raise 13,000 workers, 
yet Dalton calculated that it would raise only 2,000 and insisted on withdrawals from military 
units in the field.108 This was a major problem for Anderson’s committee, the biggest it had 
faced so far. The committee was now meeting several times each week to try and come to 
grips with it. The Lord President demurred from Dalton’s idea, on the grounds that such a 
drastic step as weakening active military units should not be contemplated until all other 
options had been exhausted; the employment of older men and youths in the mines would 
have to be explored.109 The committee expressed its hope that the coal industry would ‘put its 
house in order’ before requesting the government to undermine Britain’s armed forces: ‘Of 
all the industries, coal-mining ha[s] been the least ready to accept the changes necessary to 
preserve its efficiency under war conditions’.110 As always, Anderson was ‘immensely 
difficult to gainsay in a committee room’.111 
By late April, Bevin had managed to locate another 4,650 former miners from other 
industries and return them to the pits.112 For his part Dalton was working with Bevin on the 
organisation of the coal industry, and with Anderson on a recruitment campaign.113 But, 
realistically, the British state could now go little further; there was no surplus workforce to 
exploit. The seriousness of this situation is clear from the fact that the matter was often 
passed to the War Cabinet for discussion there, sometimes being the first item on the agenda. 
The War Cabinet had already rejected the possibility of withdrawing men from the military 
and ordered the committee to find them elsewhere.114 It fell to Anderson to devise a strategy. 
His proposed solution was to simply reduce Britain’s coal requirements. In May, after 
discussions with Churchill, he produced a memorandum which suggested reducing the 
demand for coal from 210m tons per annum to 206m.115 This was slight, but the existing 
workforce could be expected to generate 205m tons. 
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Yet this was, in effect, Churchill’s approach; it is apparent from the records that 
Anderson did not really support his own memorandum, as in the weekly committee meeting 
he was ‘inclined’ to think that the best course, after all, was to request the War Cabinet to 
authorise the release of men from field units.116 He had been swayed to Dalton’s position. 
However the Secretary of State for War still rejected this, and the committee was forced to 
study the problem further.117 Anderson was thus compelled to return to the policy discussed 
with the prime minister. Juggling the figures, over the next four days he fleshed out how coal 
production might be reduced: through fuel economy, the running-down of old colliery stocks, 
and increased work on coal outcroppings. Anderson calculated that this could reduce the 
demand from 206.75m tons to 202.5m tons; that might eradicate the deficit of 2.7m tons, and 
actually generate a surplus of 2.7m tons.118 The Lord President’s Committee thus agreed that 
the War Cabinet would not again be asked to authorise the release of men from the armed 
forces. Yet Anderson did not get all his own way: he came down in favour of domestic fuel 
rationing to improve the position further and enhance the margin of safety.119 He argued that 
as the fighting intensified, the mines would be forced to release men for the military and this 
would reduce coal production further. Domestic fuel rationing was therefore inevitable 
‘sooner or later’. The Lord President was overruled by his colleagues, who did not at this 
stage want to take such a step and favoured further efficiencies under the existing model.120 
But when the rest of his plan was put to the War Cabinet, it was approved and Anderson was 
authorised to draft a White Paper on fuel efficiency.121 
Bureaucratically, Anderson’s strategy was an ingenious solution. It tackled the 
problem by circumventing it. Increasing efficiencies in fuel economy soon gave genuine 
grounds for optimism. In real terms, however, the policy was of limited effectiveness. By late 
July, coal production was falling 100,000 tons per week short of the Lord President’s 
projections. Output per man had declined, and the existing colliery-stocks – generally poor-
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quality – had yielded only 57,000 tons in two months, rather than 45,000 per week projected 
by Anderson.122 The Lord President’s Committee decided to pay well-performing districts an 
additional bonus for increased output, in the hopes that this would incentivise performance.123 
But within a month Anderson told his colleagues that the fall in output had reached a crisis-
stage.124 He relayed that there was a ‘continuing decline’ in coal production per shift. Worse, 
‘all the measures which had been taken to increase the manpower of the industry had been 
neutralised by this continuing decline in the productivity of the labour force’; this was ‘the 
root cause’ of the crisis and it was ‘clear’ that production could not be improved until the 
causes of the decline were addressed. Increasing the workforce was thus ‘only a palliative’ 
and ignored the ‘fundamental’ problem at hand.125 
Coal production had challenged the capacity of the Lord President’s Committee to 
deal with the problems of resource-allocation. It had stimulated disagreement among 
ministers. But it is striking that where there had been discord, positions were clearly informed 
by departmental perspectives, not party affiliation. For instance, when the Minister for Fuel 
and Power identified absenteeism rather than organisation as being Anderson’s ‘root cause’, 
with miners feeling a ‘lack of … enthusiasm’, Bevin backed him.126 The committee came 
down in favour of taking the ‘exceptional step’ of publicly releasing information about the 
crisis in output (despite the intelligence this would provide to the Axis governments) as part 
of a ‘vigorous’ campaign of publicity aimed at mineworkers.127 Churchill was asked to make 
a personal appeal to miners in the form of a speech.128 Anderson did his best to silence Lloyd 
George’s demands for military manpower, arguing that the only realistic response was for the 
existing workforce to extract more fuel per shift.129  
The problem of mining sufficient coal was never satisfactorily resolved. Though 
efficiencies in the use of coal, gas and electricity overseen by Anderson meant that the fuel 
production situation in 1943 was ‘balanced’ after all,130 by the autumn projected military 
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operations for 1944 were posing a renewed challenge.131 Yet though no ideal solution was 
found, and as such there must be a degree of ambiguity in the conclusions that we draw, the 
example of coal production provides valuable insights into the role and significance of the 
Lord President’s Committee. By connecting key ministers in an information hub, the British 
state was able to get the maximum out of its available manpower and – in inevitably 
imperfect conditions – muddle through. Given that there were simply not enough people to 
fill every projected post in all areas of the war effort, some shortfall was perhaps inevitable; 
what mattered was how the state coped with that fact. In a telling remark, Anderson said that 
‘My committee is intended to be a forum, not an arena’.132 Without the co-ordination offered 
by the Lord President’s Committee, a genuine and debilitating crisis of production (as 
opposed to a largely political one) might have emerged in mid-1942.133 Detailed analysis of 
the records thus permits us to endorse Hancock and Gowing’s view that while Bevin wielded 
the formal powers over the workforce, it fell to Anderson to ‘reconcil[e] conflicting views at 
the highest level’.134 The axis between these two ‘experts’ was integral to the mobilisation of 
the British state. 
 
IV 
During the Second World War, Whitehall was more connected than ever before; but it was 
also connected to things which were also more dispersed than at any previous point, both 
geographically and intellectually. This posed problems for effective government and the 
exercise of the state’s core functions. The Lord President’s Committee was an institutional 
response to these dilemmas, a way of bringing knowledge and expertise to bear. Hugh Dalton 
described its meetings as ‘awfully slow’,135 but they were also detailed and deliberate, and 
solutions were sometimes imaginative. 
25 
 
This article, inevitably, is not comprehensive and underlines the need for further 
research in an important yet neglected archive. A larger study might examine the work of the 
committee during the entire war, pursuing its instructions into individual Whitehall 
departments and shedding light on how far policy was mediated by the different levels of the 
state apparatus. Yet we can safely draw some provisional conclusions. Previous neglect of the 
Lord President’s Committee is a significant omission from the literature on both government 
and party politics. Its existence boosted the contributions of a number of individuals, most 
obviously Anderson but also Attlee, Lyttelton and the economists in the Economic Section. 
Analysis of its records offers fresh perspectives on a range of issues, from domestic 
administration to cross-party cooperation between senior politicians. For example, whereas 
most historians have emphasised the role of Bevin in the organisation of the war economy, 
Edgerton recently argued that Anderson was ‘almost certainly more significant than Bevin in 
production matters’.136 In fact the records themselves are slightly more ambiguous. While 
Anderson steered the committee as a whole, it is also clear that he almost always supported 
Bevin’s favoured policies. Rather than trying to establish which of these organisational ‘tsars’ 
was the more important, then, we should perhaps see Anderson and Bevin as constituting a 
powerful team. The location of the committee at the top of the Whitehall system, with other 
bodies sitting beneath it, provided a means of establishing effective oversight of the war 
machine. Raw data flowed up and down this highway; the organisation created by Anderson 
was a way of systemising it, rendering it manageable, and imposing a degree of leadership 
over it. Between 1941 and 1942, the Lord President’s Committee – and especially its 
chairman – had employed that machinery to help coordinate Britain’s domestic apparatus. 
The committee’s work, and the collaborative relationships that drove it, appear to 
support Middlemas’s notion of the development of a system in which ‘a consensual view of 
the national interest’ tended to hold sway in a web of wider connections linking ministers, 
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businesses, trade unions, political parties and state bureaucracy.137 (In this period, 
particularly, ‘consensus’ is a loaded term; the ‘consensus’ revealed in the Lord President’s 
Committee is perhaps a more limited one than that of Paul Addison’s The Road to 1945, 
marked by the fruitful working relationships of senior politicians sharing a series of 
managerial challenges.) Though Middlemas’s is an older, more ‘conventional’ interpretation, 
it may also be that in some respects these can – and should – be reconciled with more recent 
‘revisionist’ versions. Despite Edgerton’s justifiable emphasis on expanding our definition of 
the war machine, Middlemas equally stressed the need for a sense of the wider picture.138 
Moreover, while older political historians arguably had a narrow view of the war economy – 
with an over-emphasis on Bevin and Whitehall – nevertheless they were right in their instinct 
that the Lord President’s Committee was a crucial part of the apparatus. The conclusions 
reached by historians are always shaped by where they choose to look, so it may be that with 
regards to these debates a degree of reconciliation is in order. 
It was perhaps with his experiences as Lord President in mind that Anderson was 
invited to deliver the Romanes lecture in 1946. In an address entitled ‘The Machinery of 
Government’, Anderson reflected at length on the advantages offered by the kind of 
structures that he himself had established and presided over. In an important description, he 
discerned in Cabinet committees modelled on the Lord President’s Committee the means to 
‘make a reality of collective responsibility’ among ministers. The system ensured that ‘the 
policies of different departments are consistent with each other and form one coherent 
whole’.139 
Scrutinising Anderson’s leadership of the committee enables us to grasp why 
Churchill placed such faith in him. The prime minister kept Anderson, above all other 
ministers, informed of the progress of the top-secret ‘Tube Alloys’ project (the atomic 
bomb),140 and advised the king that if he and Eden should die before the end of the war, 
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Anderson – ‘the automatic pilot’ – ought to be his successor.141 Interestingly, the Lord 
President appears to have been friendly with Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff and himself an astute administrator. The two were both denizens of clubland; they 
occasionally had lunch at the Athenaeun; and Brooke entertained Anderson at home.142 For 
Churchill, Anderson may have fulfilled a domestic role analogous to that of Brooke in the 
realm of strategy: temperamentally Anderson and Brooke were cut from the same cloth, and 
had similar skills. The prime minister never personally warmed to either but relied on them 
immensely. Brooke (who generally thought little of politicians) admired the Lord President as 
‘one of the best in Cabinet’.143 
The work of Anderson also underlines that Conservatives were integral to the 
expansion of the British state that occurred under the pressures of war. Because the modified 
boundaries of government were doctrinally more amenable to the Labour party than the 
Conservatives – and Labour ministers played a key role in bringing this about – there has 
been a tendency to downplay the centrality of Conservative politicians to the remaking of the 
state. As Edgerton and Ball have suggested, this should be reassessed. Besides Anderson 
himself, no politician did more to devise the apparatus of controls than Lyttelton. Meanwhile 
Beaverbrook and Wood were similarly important figures. For all the policy innovation of 
Attlee, Bevin and Morrison it was, arguably, Conservative ministers who actually legitimised 
the changing scope and mindset of British government; their eager involvement largely 
extracted partisan politics from the equation and left the solutions being implemented 
resembling little more than common sense. To be sure, wartime Whitehall would have been 
compelled to engage in ‘planning’ whatever the politics or personnel. But, under Anderson’s 
leadership of the Lord President’s Committee, planning was made more efficient than had 
previously been thought likely; the flow of raw data available to policymakers was greatly 
improved; and departments were under standing orders to act holistically. The possibilities of 
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new kinds of state action – bureaucratically under Anderson, in terms of controls under 
Lyttelton, and financially under Wood – had largely been established by Conservatives 
ministers. 
So how far did Anderson govern according to recognisably ‘conservative’ principles? 
Or was his statecraft purely pragmatic? The assumptions of the Lord President appear to have 
been that policy problems were there to be solved in the most effective manner, without 
regard to political point-scoring or ideological fidelity. This probably reflected his 
background as a civil servant. It does not mean that Anderson was not a Conservative – in 
1941 he reassured Conservative backbench opinion that he would not tolerate any attempts to 
implement ‘nationalisation by stealth’,144 the following year he was sceptical about what he 
considered to be a premature expansion of the welfare state,145 and in 1944 he insisted that 
the government commit to pursuing a ‘high and stable level of employment’ in the post-war 
period rather than ‘full employment’ as desired by Labour.146 Roy Jenkins identified a ‘slight 
falseness’ to Anderson’s non-partisan image, and even judged that it was a ‘smokescreen’.147 
Nor did Lyttelton, Wood and others abandon their own conservatism. For the most part, 
though, we can see that even more consciously ‘political’ Conservatives struggled to relate 
their principles to the demands of war. On the other hand, if an important aspect of the 
conservative cosmology is to emphasise practice,148 then the work of Anderson and others 
may underline the resiliency – and continued relevance – of that mentality in an environment 
of extreme instability. Planning the management of finite national resources was something 
that those of all political complexions could rally around. In this respect the Lord President’s 
Committee reminds us of the extent to which the Churchill coalition was essentially a 
problem-solving exercise – and, for the most part, how well it performed in that task. Inside 
the committee, traditional political dividing lines between parties and ideas were seldom in 
evidence. This is not to overlook the fact that Britain’s leading politicians came to develop 
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increasingly divergent visions of the future. Yet it does indicate that, at the top, and in terms 
of what the coalition was formed to do, there was indeed something of a ‘consensus’ – if only 
in a shared attitude and willingness to innovate. 
This article has made a number of points. It has argued that exploring the archive of 
the Lord President’s Committee, rather than confirming conventional or revisionist 
approaches to the wartime state, suggests that both have considerable merit but also that we 
need to ask fresh questions in light of these sources. In addition, it has suggested that the 
committee enriches our understanding of party politics and cooperation. This perhaps leaves 
us with a more rounded, nuanced impression of British politics during the Second World 
War: enduring division outside Westminster and cut-throat competition within it,149 but also 
deep co-operation inside the Whitehall machine. If we are to fully appreciate the richness of 
British public life at this point, there may be a need to read the evidence through several 
different lenses. The many possible narratives of the period are by no means incompatible. 
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